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JUDICIAL REGIME STABILITY AND THE VOTING BEHAVIOR
OF LAWYER-LEGISLATORS
Larry L. Berg*

Justin J. Green**
John R. Schmidhauser
I. Stability Characteristics
Max Weber and Emile Durkheim each made unique and highly significant
contributions to the analysis of those characteristics of social and political systems
which may contribute to the stability or continuity of specific component institutions or total systems. Their theoretical contributions and the special attention
which they focused upon legal professionals and institutions provide an excellent
foundation for the development of rigorous cross-national or intra-national
comparison of legal personnel and institutions.
Weber's identification of the three modem bases of legitimacy-legality,
formally correct rules, and accepted procedure--also suggested both to him and
subsequently to others the possible linkages between legal professionalism and
the system-maintaining or stabilizing behavior of legislators, judges, and administrators. In advanced societies, legal professionalization is a concomitant of the
general development of specialization.2 The universality of legal professionalism
in such societies, and the real or ostensible ubiquity of lawyers in executive, legislative, or judicial offices suggests a comparative research strategy which eschews,
at least temporarily, the exceedingly difficult task of determining the cross-system
comparability of structural or functional variables.' Instead, this strategy embodies: (1) the identification of those system-maintaining norms and those attributes of legal professional behavior which, according to the theoretical assump**
***
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1 M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 77 (A. M.
Henderson and Talcott Parsons translation, 1947).
2 For an empirical investigation of some possible explanations of the relationship of legal
specialization and social characteristics see R. Schwartz & J. Miller, Legal Evolution and Societal
Complexity, 70 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 167 (1964).
3 For example, is "judicial review" as ordained in the contemporary constitutions of
Japan, West Germany or Italy conceptually equivalent to the American or U.S. model? For a
definitive analysis of the necessity for such shift in emphasis see J. Wahlke, Policy Demands and
System Support in MODERN PARLIAMENTS 141-71 "(G. Loewenberg ed. 1971). Gerhard Loewen-

berg, assessing the empirical problems raised by the functional approach in comparative legislative research, states flatly that "unless the functional requisites of political systems are defined in operational terms which are equivalent cross-nationally, the concept cannot be used
in comparative research. . . ."

In the same analysis, he also observed that "....

whether any

set of functions is performed in all political systems is itself an empirical question, which has
hardly been raised, let alone answered. . ." G. Loewenberg, Comparative Legislative Research
in COMPARATIVE LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR: FRONTIERS OF RESEARCH 11 (S. Patterson & J.
Wahlke eds. 1972). Among the small, but hardy, band of comparative judicial researchers,
scholars of the calibre of Donald P. Kommers have performed yeoman service by directly attacking identical problems in the judicial area. See, for example, D. Kommers, Cross-national
Comparisons of Constitutional Courts: Toward a Theory of Judicial Review (unpublished
paper delivered at the 66th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los
Angeles, California, September, 1970).
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tions of Weber and Durkheim, are universal in complex modem societies and
(2) their application to determine empirically the validity of two of Durkheim's
hypotheses that are related directly to the stability of political institutions and
total systems.
The first of these hypotheses is embodied in Durkheim's Professional Ethics
and Civic Morals, where he stated that professions which have a "public character" such as "the army, education, the law... ," because of their association
with governments in power or regimes, possess a high degree of cohesiveness and
are supportive of "public" purposes and the stability of regimes.' Secondly, because Durkheim was primarily concerned about social integration, or the investigation of what holds societies together, he attempted to develop explanatory
hypotheses of even broader scope than those based upon conceptions of the
public professions. With respect to this broader perspective, Talcott Parsons has
underscored the importance of Durkheim's idea of "mechanical solidarity""the integration of the common values of the society with the commitments of
units within it to contribute to the attainment of collective goals----either negatively by refraining from action which would be felt to be disruptive of this function, or positively by taking responsibility for it."5 Durkheim frequently emphasized that units of government would comprise the institutions most likely
to demonstrate mechanical solidarity.6 This concept of mechanical solidarity
provides one means of determining variances in regime stability which are more
subtle than the extreme of either political immobility or violent revolution. As
Gerhard Loewenberg put it, "some of the most abrupt and fundamental political
changes occur . . . without significant internal violence, without significant

fluctuations in authority, and without the disappearance of political systems.""
Drawing upon this background, systems stability is defined in this analysis
as the maintenance of those institutions, norms, and values which in balance
comprise the constitution (whether written or unwritten) of a particular political system. Behavior which weakens or seeks to weaken one institution or essential norms in relation to others is thus defined as antistabilizing. The emphasis
is upon actual behavior rather than on attitudes.
One means of testing these hypotheses is to compare the voting behavior
of lawyer-legislators and nonlawyer-legislators on "institution-weakening" legislation concerned with the key judicial institution for a sufficiently long and continuous time period in a suitable political system. For the purpose of this preliminary analysis, the roll call voting behavior of all members of the U.S. House
of Representatives and Senate on every "institution-weakening" proposal relating
to the Supreme Court of the United States during the period 1927-1968 was
categorized as stabilizing or antistabilizing. For example, legislation designed
to limit the capacity of the Supreme Court to render definitive decisions in federal-state relations or to deny the Court jurisdictional authority to provide sub4 Emile Durkheim, ProfessionalEthics and Civic Morals 7-8 (1958).
5 T. Parsons, Durkheim's Contribution to the Theory of Integration of Social Systems,
EMiLE DURKHEIM, 1858-1917 127 (K. Wolff ed. 1960).
6 See id. at 127-29.

7

G. Loewenberg, The Influence of ParliamentaryBehavior on Regime Stability, 3 Com-

PARA.TIvE PoLrrics 182 (January, 1971).
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stantive or procedural safeguards in criminal justice or internal security cases
would weaken substantially the power and influence of the Supreme Court and
alter the balance of power within the system. Objectives of this sort were fundamental to the Jenner legislation which came before the 85th Congress, or Representative Howard Smith's anti-Court bill (H.R.3) in the 86th Congress. s
In addition, the voting behavior of all members of two specialized units
within each legislative chamber, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees,
was similarly categorized for the identical time span (utilizing roll calls on the
same "institution-weakening" legislation) as a more direct operationalization of
Durkheim's "mechanical solidarity." Thus, House and Senate Judiciary Committee members, who by the modem norms of American congressional committee selection are legal professionals, not only may be expected to support the
stability of the system because they are lawyers but also because they are members
of units established both to facilitate judicial legislation and to contribute to and
maintain the total governmental system. Indeed, these committees are assigned
responsibility for initially screening proposals for the most fundamental changes
in the system-constitutional amendments. If Durkheim's hypotheses are valid,
Judiciary Committee members presumably would be stronger supporters of the
Court than other lawyer-legislators and both would be more supportive than
legislators who are not legal professionals. Membership on the Senate and House
Judiciary Committees is actively pursued by some lawyer-legislators. It seems
reasonable to suggest that lawyer-legislators who actively seek membership on
the committees with direct responsibility for much of the legislation related to
the courts and the federal judicial system would be among those members of
Congress more likely to be legal professionals and presumably more likely to be
supportive of the stability of system. Furthermore, if ever professional norms
were to be salient, it should be to these people who in their daily activities have
the opportunity to shape the attitudes of their colleagues and of the public to
the judiciary. Before undertaking direct tests of the validity of these hypotheses,
appropriate attention must be directed to several definitional and classificatory
problems which are basic to cross-national comparative research.
II. Comparative Utilization of Concepts of Lawyers and Legal
Professional Norms
The generality of a theory refers, in the words of Przeworski and Teune "to
the range of social phenomena to which it is applicable."'" In order to meet the
requirements of conceptual equivalence which are prerequisites for subsequent
use of those measures which may be universally applied to determine accuracy
and, if possible, causality, the broadest possible definition of the term "lawyer"
8 A complete description and listing of this legislation can be obtained directly from the
authors. A description of these roll calls for the period from 1947 through 1968 can be found in
L. Berg, The Supreme Court and Congress: Conflict and Interaction, 1947-1968, 425-48
(University of California, Santa Barbara, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation 1972).
9 Id. at 348.
10 A. Przeworski & H. Teune, THE LoGIc OF COMPARATIVE SOCIAL INQUIRY 21 (1970).
Universality is, of course, only one of four attributes for empirically interpretable comparative
social science research. The others comprise accuracy, parsimony, and causality.
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has been applied: Any individual who meets the requirements of legal education,
such as passing entrance examinations, is defined as a lawyer. Acceptance of
this broad definition eliminates distinctions between categories of lawyers, distinctions based upon styles of practice, or differences between individuals admitted
to the bar but not engaged in private practice and the private practitioner.
Mogens Pedersen's contention that such a general definition should be consistently
applied is predicated upon his belief that "it is the relationship between the whole
legal profession and politics which should occupy our interest."" Indeed, the
general applicability of the norms of the American legal profession relating to
systems maintenance encompasses all who were admitted to the bar. These
norms are explicitly related to judicial institutions and personnel of the sort
which are utilized in the empirical tests of Durkheim's hypotheses.
Not only does utilization of an all-encompassing definition of legal professionals provide the basis for general application in cross-national or intra-national
research, but the concomitant universality of the judicial systems support or
maintenance norms of the legal profession presumably may facilitate cross-national testing of the hypotheses investigated herein. Alexis de Tocquevilie preceded
Durkheim in stressing the stabilizing propensities of lawyers and the occupational
and legal educational characteristics which purportedly strengthened or contributed to those propensities. In a section of Democracy in America entitled "Mitigations of the Tyranny of the Majority" de Tocqueville summed up the rationale
for his emphasis upon the linkage between lawyers and stability:
Men who have more especially devoted themselves to legal pursuits,
derive from those occupations certain habits of order, a taste for formalities,
and a kind of instinctive regard for the regular connection of ideas, which
naturally render them very hostile to the revolutionary spirit and the unreflecting passions of the multitude.
The special information which lawyers derive from their studies, ensures
them a separate station in society; and they constitute a sort of privileged
body in the scale of intelligence. This notion of their superiority perpetually
recurs to them in the practice of their profession: they are the masters of a
science which is necessary, but which is not very generally known: they
serve as arbiters between the citizens; and the habit of directing the blind
passions of parties in litigation to their purposes, inspires them with a certain
contempt for the judgement of the multitude. To this it may be added, that
they naturally constitute a body; not by any previous understanding, or by
an agreement which directs them to a common end; but the analogy of
their studies and the uniformity of their proceedings connect their minds
together, as much as a common interest could combine their endeavours .... 12
To what extent do the norms of the legal profession emphasize system support and, in particular, support for the judiciary? Do the norms tentatively
verify or contradict the hypotheses or heuristic statements of Durkheim, de
Tocqueville, and to a more guarded extent, Weber? Virtually every group within
the United States legal profession asserts (or at least gives lip service to) the pro11

M. Pedersen, Lawyers in Politics: The Danish Folketing and United States Legislatures,

in CoMPARATrvE LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR: FRONTIERS oF RESEARCH 49 (1972).

Pedersen provides an excellent discussion of the variety of conceptualizations of lawyers. Id. at 46-49.
12 A. de Tocqueville, 1 DEmocP.Acv IN AMERICA 322-23 (1961).
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fession's obligation to maintain the integrity of the courts. Indeed, this norm
is reinforced not only by the canons of professional ethics but also by the tradition
which describes an attorney as an officer of the court and through frequent invocation by the courts themselves.
The editors of American Jurisprudenceindicated that the role of an attorney
as an officer of the court is fairly explicit-while the lawyer is not a "public
officer" in an official sense, he "must maintain a respectful and courteous attitude
toward" the courts.' s This imperative is frequently reiterated by the courts in
a very direct manner. For example, a decision of a Nevada court asserted, "It
is the special duty and obligation of members of the bar to protect the good name
of the courts against ill-founded and unwarranted attacks.""
Specifically referring to the lawyer's obligation to the courts, the Canons of
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association are described as undertaking
"to codify the traditions and practice recognized over the centuries as part of
the common law with respect to lawyers' obligations."' 5 This Canon is very
explicit:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly
free to defend themselves, are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of
the Bar against unjust criticism and clamor .... 3
The intimate relationship between the organized bar and state and federal judicial systems is constantly reinforced by the development of reciprocal obligations
such as the traditional advisory role fulfilled by the bar regarding modification
of judicial rules.' Thus, lawyers not only are professionally socialized to maintain respect for the courts, but they also presumably may be motivated to maintain a system within which they enjoy a preferred status.
A. One System's Experience
The data set with which Durkheim's hypotheses were tested consisted of
the total universe of 38 roll calls on institution-weakening legislation during the
period 1927-1968 in both Houses of the United States Congress. The unit of
analysis chosen was the congressional session (one calendar year) so that a
series of roll calls on a single issue would not distort the broader relationships being
sought. This process resulted in the examination of roll-call voting behavior in
eight years for the Senate and six for the House of Representatives. An institution support score was computed for each member for each year. It consisted
of the number of votes determined to be in support of the judiciary normed by
the total number of roll calls on institution-weakening legislation. The Congress13
14
15
16
17

7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law §§ 3-4 (1963).
Id. at 46, citing In Re Breen, 30 Nev. 164, 93 p. 997 (1908).
Id.
AM. JUR. 2d DEsK Boox, Doe. 91 (1962).
See Order Adopting Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 348 U.S.

945 (1964).
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men were then separated into groups within each chamber according to the
several independent variables discussed below.
The test of the hypotheses consists of a comparison of mean support scores
between groups. If one group consistently outscores the other in terms of support
for the judiciary as determined by the binomial sign test, it then can be concluded that the independent variable defining the groups represents an axis
along which judiciary-related attitudes divide."
It was originally reported that an analysis of all court-related legislationboth institution-weakening and those merely modifying policy, such as congressional reversal of judicial statutory interpretations (but omitting judicial nomination and housekeeping roll calls) for the period 1937-1968-indicated that
lawyer-legislators were no more supportive of the judiciary than their nonlawyer
colleagues. It was further pointed out that a legislator's political party seemed
to be a variable contributing substantially to the explanation of voting behavior
on court-related legislation. 9
A second appraisal of the same data set considered the voting behavior of
members of the Judiciary Committees. It was concluded therein that the gatekeeper function with respect to judiciary-oriented legislation appeared to have
little if any effect on committee members. Their voting behavior was not signif20
icantly different from that of noncommittee members, whether lawyers or not.
This research, therefore, is limited to the analysis of voting behavior on
institution-weakening legislation in order to test directly Durkheim's hypotheses.
Essentially a control for the meaning of the legislation has been imposed on the
lawyer data set. The concern is not with legislation seeking to modify or reverse
Supreme Court decisions but with a narrowly defined set of issues that strike at
the basic functioning of the judiciary and its relations with other branches of
government. Charts IA through 2B indicate that invoking this control has
changed somewhat the tenor of the argument. Lawyers in the Senate rank
higher than nonlawyers in support of the Court in six of the eight years, a difference significant at the .05 level.2 ' The opposite is true in the House of Representatives where lawyers outscored nonlawyers only once in six years, although
this pattern is not significantly different from chance. It would seem, therefore,
that on the basic issues, those affecting the role of the judiciary in the American
political system, the members of the legal profession in the Senate do conform,
at least partially, to Durkheim's first hypothesis. It must be stipulated, however,
that the hypothesis was tested with only a small number of cases. When the data
set is extended back to include substantially more institution-weakening votes,
then perhaps a more definitive statement about lawyer-nonawyer legislative
voting behavior can be made.
When the focus is shifted to the Judiciary Committees, Durkheim's theories
18 A more extensive description of the methodology can be found in J. Green, J. Schmidhauser, L. Berg & D. Brady, Lawyers in Congress: A New Look at Some Old Assumptions,
26 WESTERN POL. Q. 441-43 (1973).
19 Id.
20 J. Schmidhauser, J. Green & L. Berg, The Supreme Court and the Congress: The
Lawyer Monopoly Committees and the Myth of Reverence Toward the Court (unpublished
paper).
21 S. Siegal, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (1956).
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TABLE IA

Lawyer-Nonlawyer Behavior,
Senate 1927-1968
-Non-lawyers
-

Lawyers

37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
YEARS

TABLE 18
LaMyer-Nonlawyer Behavior,
House of Representatives
1927-1968

Non-lawyers
-- -

-

-Lawyers

40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 6465 66 67 68 69
YEARS
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Fgure 2A
Distribution of Adjusted Mean Scores
on Type I Roll Calls by
Judiciary Committee Members, and All Other Members
U.S. Senate, 1937-1968
-

-

-

-

Judiciary Committee Members

(mean .516)
All Other Members
(mean .477)

1937

1940

1954

1958

1964

1965

1966

1968

Figure 2B
Distribution of Adjusted Mean Scores
on Type I Roll Calls by
Judiciary Committee Members, and All Other Members
U. S. House of Representatves, 1937-1968"
-

-

-

--

,Judiciary Committee Members
(mean .320)
All Other Members
(mean .364)

1940

1945
1958
1959
*The first roilcall occurred in 1940.

1964

1965
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fare much worse.2" Members of the House of Representatives Committee on the
Judiciary actually demonstrated less support for the Supreme Court in the thirteen roll-call divisions in six years than did all other House members (see Figure
2B). The overall mean score for the lawyer monopolized committee was .320
while the mean score for all noncommittee members was .364. The distribution
of mean annual computed Court support scores in Figure 2B is, however, relatively similar for both groups in the House. The Senate data on roll calls on institution-weakening proposals (Figure 2A) differ in that Senate Judiciary Committee members recorded stronger Court support scores than noncommittee
members, but again the distributions are basically similar. Members of the Senate
also recorded higher overall Court support scores on such proposals than did
members of the House of Representatives for the entire period 1937-68.
Additional information about the voting behavior of lawyer legislators and
of the Judiciary Committee members in particular was obtained by dividing the
nonmember category into lawyers and nonlawyers. Comparisons of mean support scores from overall roll calls for these three groups are presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Mean Support Scores
by Group on Institution-weakening Legislation

Judiciary Committee Member
Nonmember lawyer
Nonmember nonlawyer

H.R.

Sen.

.320
.358
.372

.516
.492
.454

Several conclusions can be drawn from the table. First, within each column
the range of scores is quite small, a maximum of .062 for the Senate. It, therefore, can be said that the differences between the three groups do not permit us
to infer that service on the Judiciary Committee in any way affects the member's
attitude toward the Court. Second, after examining the ranking of the three
groups in terms of strength of support, the data again do not single out the Committee as a bastion of support for the Supreme Court. Committee members are
strongest in support only in the Senate and, as already noted, by very minimal
margins. It is interesting to note that in the House, nonlawyers rank highest in
support of the Court; but again the figures best support a conclusion of no
difference between the groups.
In conclusion, the evidence generated by the United States Congress is
somewhat contradictory. There is one point at which Durkheim's hypothesis is
supported by the data; voting behavior on institution-weakening legislation by
members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary; but three other tests do not
support the mechanical solidarity hypothesis.
B. Comparative Research on the Judiciary
Institution-weakening legislation represents something more than a fit of
22

The Supreme Court and the Congress, supra, note 20.
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pique on the part of some members of Congress. It goes beyond the immediate
object of wrath, the public policy expressed in a specific decision, and seeks to
punish the responsible party-in this case the Supreme Court---so as to prevent
reoccurrence. In Durkheim's terms such proposals represent a crisis in the political system. At stake is the concept of judicial independence and the ability of
the courts to interpret and apply the law as they deem proper. A continuously
successful campaign against a judiciary by the legislature would render it impotent and little more than an arbiter in relatively trivial interpersonal conflicts.
Every modem political system possesses a judiciary, and all charge it with
the interpretation and enforcement of laws, including a constitution should there
be one. This status of the judiciary in all cases is subject to change by a legislature although the consent of other parties might also be required. Thus, the
United States scheme is not at all atypical and it should be possible to identify
within each of a number of countries issues that serve the function of institutionweakening legislative proposals. These must constitute a test of the existence
or independence of the judiciary, or a measure of its ability to fulfill the role of
constitutional referee in either a traditional or an emerging society.
How then can Durkheim's hypothesis be operationalized? To what can we
look for evidence of system stability? The frequency with which such crises
occur is one measure. In the United States, for example, a decade passed without
roll calls on institution-weakening legislation, between 1927 and 1937, even
though this was a period of severe dislocation and stress in other sectors of the
political system. Not all political, social, or economic crises place the judiciary
and the legislature in confrontation with each other so when it happens the roots
of the system are endangered. Although during the Depression and the New
Deal periods the economic and political fabric of the country underwent substantial alterations, the judiciary was not attacked by a roll call on institutionweakening legislation in Congress even though the court-packing controversy
produced volumes of rhetorical exchanges in Congress regarding the role of the
Supreme Court.
It is highly likely that the results of similar investigations in other nations
will reveal a wide range of circumstances. Nevertheless, all are interpretable
within the context of the systems maintenance and mechanical solidarity models
posited by Durkheim. Systems in which the legislature never votes on the equivalent of institution-weakening legislation have adequately stabilized the position
of the judiciary within the political environment. It may or may not be the
same relatively high status experienced in the United States. The point is that
the judiciary has found its niche and performs whatever functions it has without serious external challenge.
More interesting are those systems, such as the United States, in which the
struggle continues. In these cases, the research reported here is of some interest
because the more often lawyer-legislators are found to be nonsupportive of the
judiciary, comparatively speaking, then the less useful become the branches of
public professions as a source of reciprocal support for coordinate branches of
government. It is abundantly clear that the system in the United States was a
valid test of the Durkheim hypothesis: the legal profession itself explicitly

1022
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adapted the role Durkheim had prescribed for it. What of other nations, perhaps
those in which the legal profession like many other features of the political system,
is not developed or is nonexistent? This configuration should have no consequence for testing the hypotheses in that Durkheim did not specify limited
applicability for his theorems. Lawyers everywhere constitute a public profession
not by constitutional or statutory fiat but by the very nature of their activities.
It is to be expected that even in the absence of strictures similar to those found in
American Jurisprudenceor the Canons of Legal Ethics, lawyers will support the
judiciary.
In a sense this reasoning ignores some basic findings of legislative research
in countries other than the United States. What of the role of political parties?
Do they not dominate legislative behavior in parliamentary systems "unlike" the
United States? There are some researchable questions here in spite of a seemingly formidable array of facts. To what extent, however, are institution-weakening proposals perceived by party leaders as requiring party discipline? To
the extent that they are so visualized, the assumption underlying this research
is valid. Roll calls on institution-weakening legislation represent periods of crisis
for a political system during which fundamental or etiological questions are to
be answered. If, however, whips are not brought out and party discipline not
enforced, then parliament members are free to vote other convictions and the
ideas of Durkheim are as likely a basis for expectations as any others.
An allied question is the relationship between parties and the legal profession. In the United States Congress between 1937 and 1968, for example, the
Democratic Party had proportionately more lawyers among its members than
did the Republican Party. Even though at times the majority of Democrats
were lawyers, the party never was dominated or controlled by an occupational
bloc. Not yet has a party under the clear control of the legal profession been
shown to exist in any country although not everywhere has the point been researched. It is possible, though admittedly highly unlikely, that party divisions
conceal a lawyer-nonlawyer split on institution-weakening legislation and issues;
hence the enforcement of party discipline would have an additional meaning.
If all present indications prove to be valid and the dominance of political
parties is demonstrated on legislative votes involving judicial institutions, then a
relatively broad generalization is in order. The concept of law as a public profession operationalized in a rather obvious behavioral context is dysfunctional.
If political scientists are to continue seeking the roots of system stability and the
factors that control relationships within a government, the legal profession is not
a fruitful source for answers. The data from the United States suggests that this
is indeed the case. Although the paucity of data made findings of statistical
significance difficult, the general direction suggested by the analysis points to
party and, perhaps, ideology and not occupation as a correlate of attitudes
toward the judiciary. If it can be shown that this experience is generalizable
to the effect that judiciaries without regard to national boundaries are proven
to be dependent upon political supports such as parties, ideological, regional,
ethnic, or other groupings for their continued institutional viability, then perhaps
something of interest has been demonstrated.

